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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF FEMALE INMATES 
TO BE FREE FROM CROSS-GENDER PAT-FRISKS 
 
Jennifer R. Weiser∗ 
‘[U]se a flat hand and pushing motion across the [inmate’s] 
crotch area. . . . [P]ush inward and upward when searching the 
crotch area and upper thighs of the inmate.’  All seams in the leg 
and the crotch area are to be ‘squeezed and kneaded.’  Using the 
back of the hand, the guard also is to search the breast area in a 
sweeping motion, so that the breasts will be ‘flattened.’1 
 
These were the training instructions given to male prison guards 
at the Washington Corrections Center for Women (“WCCW”) when, 
in February of 1989, the superintendent of the women’s correctional 
facility instituted a pat-frisk policy that permitted male guards to 
search the clothed bodies of female inmates.2  The change from a 
same-gender to cross-gender random search policy was done in order 
to create an “unpredictable element” within the institution so that 
inmates would always be on guard about transporting contraband.3  
Yet, no regard was paid to the psychological effect this procedure 
would have on the female inmates — eighty-five percent of whom 
had been victims of physical and/or sexual abuse4 — who would be 
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 1 Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Washington 
Corrections Center for Women prison training material). 
 2 Eldon Vail became the new WCCW Superintendent in January of 1989.  Id. at 
1523.  Shortly thereafter, he authorized random searches because he thought the 
fixed checkpoints were “ineffective in controlling the movement of contraband” 
throughout the prison.  Id.  Then on February 26, 1989, Vail instituted another new 
policy that permitted male guards to conduct random searches of female inmates 
and took  effect on July 5, 1989.  Id. 
 3 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1548 (Trott, J., dissenting).  Vail asserted that if an inmate 
knew there were only male guards in one area of the prison, then that inmate could 
freely move contraband through that area.  Id.  at 1554. 
 4 Id. at 1525 (relying on a study conducted by a former child psychologist at the 
prison). 
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subjected to this highly intrusive form of unwanted sexualized 
touching.5 
INTRODUCTION 
Permitting male prison guards to touch the breasts and crotches 
of female prisoners in the context of routine pat-frisks offends moral 
and ethical standards of human dignity.6  In addition, the 
psychological consequences can be profound.  Given the extreme 
power imbalance in prison, these procedures have a clear 
psychological parallel to childhood sexual abuse or adult rape or 
sexual assault, and can bring to mind devastating experiences of past 
violation.7  Nevertheless, courts have yet to declare clothed body 
 
 5 Pat-frisks involve physical contact that is commonly associated with sexualized 
touching (e.g., the touching of the breast or vaginal area), especially when 
performed on a woman by a man.  Unwanted sexualized touching can have 
deleterious psychological effects, particularly for women who have histories of sexual 
abuse.  For women, pat-frisks by females are less likely to be associated with 
sexualized touching.  Furthermore, there is a substantially lesser threat of other 
females making inappropriate sexual contact, verbalizations, or intimidation.  
Perpetrators of sexual abuse against females are almost exclusively male.  See, e.g., Jan 
Heney & Connie M. Kristiansen, An Analysis of the Impact of Prison on Women Survivors 
of Childhood Sexual Abuse, WOMEN AND THERAPY 29-44 (1998); C.G. COLL ET AL., The 
Experience of Women in Prison: Implications for Service and Prevention, WOMEN AND 
THERAPY 11-28 (1998). 
 6 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT. ALL TOO FAMILIAR: 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS, 52-55 (1996), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, REPORT OF THE  
MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES ON ISSUE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN STATE AND 
FEDERAL PRISON (1999), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.255-57, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE: 
VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1999), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org.  Cross-gender pat-frisk policies also depart from 
internationally accepted policy, which restricts the presence of male corrections 
officers inside women’s prisons to non-contact positions or requires that any male 
corrections officer be accompanied at all times by a female corrections officer.  See 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR), adopted by the 
First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
held in Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its 
resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977; see also 
Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating 
International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law — A Case Study of 
Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71 (2000) (analyzing the sexual 
abuse of women by male corrections officials under international human rights 
standards). 
 7 Researchers have established the capacity for unwanted sexual contact to 
induce a resurfacing of emotions and beliefs associated with prior victimization, 
creating the potential for retraumatization.  See, e.g., Heney & Kristiansen, supra note 
5, at 29-44. 
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searches of females inmates by male corrections officers 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.8 
Whether and to what extent the Constitution protects prisoners’ 
bodily privacy and integrity is unclear because the Supreme Court has 
never ruled on this issue.9  While most federal appellate courts have 
recognized the retention of such a right, they differ in the extent to 
which they have required prisoners’ privacy rights to yield to 
institutional concerns.10 
Almost all of the cases that have challenged the constitutionality 
of cross-gender searches under the Fourth Amendment have done so 
in the context of allegations by male inmates that their privacy rights 
were violated when searched by female officers.11  While some courts 
have recognized that male inmates have a constitutionally-protected 
privacy right to be free from strip and body-cavity searches12 by female 
 
 8 Most state Departments of Corrections have taken the initiative to prohibit 
cross-gender pat-frisks through administrative regulations, recognizing that it is in 
their best interest to fashion self-imposed limits on intimate cross-gender touching 
because these types of searches are readily susceptible to abuses of power. See 
National Institute of Corrections, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
IN PRISONS: LAW, AGENCY RESPONSE AND PREVENTION (1996), available at 
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/prisons.htm. 
 9 The sole Supreme Court pronouncement in the female guard/male prisoner 
arena is Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), in which the Court concluded that 
the particularly dangerous, jungle-like conditions in the Alabama prisons made 
women officers especially vulnerable to sexual attack.  Id. at 334-36.  Thus the Court 
held that prison administrators had a sufficiently strong security interest in excluding 
female guards despite their employment rights.  Id. at 334.  A strong dissent by 
Justice Marshall, however, denounced the majority’s decision as depriving the 
plaintiff of employment because of her womanhood, the very result that Title VII was 
designed to prevent.  Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 340 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 10 See infra PART I. 
 11 The allegations in such cases are that the cross-gender search policies are 
unreasonable or harmful specifically because a guard of the opposite gender is 
conducting the otherwise reasonable search.  See, e.g., Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 
912, 915 (6th Cir. 1992); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 184 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 12 During a strip search, a prisoner is required to completely disrobe in front of a 
corrections official.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 n.39 (1979) (citing Wolfish 
v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978)).  In addition, the inmate may be asked to 
open his mouth, display the soles of his feet, and present open hands and arms.  Id.  
Visual body-cavity examinations of male inmates involve the additional step of 
bending over, lifting the genitals, and spreading the buttocks to allow a visual 
inspection of the anus.  Id.  Females must follow a similar procedure, including a 
visual vaginal inspection.  Id.  It should be noted, however, that jurisdictions define 
these searches differently.  For example, states like Illinois define strip searches to 
include visual body-cavity examinations.  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-1(d) 
(2002).  In contrast, New Jersey defines strip searches and body-cavity searches 
separately, with the latter including both visual and manual searches of body-cavities.  
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officers,13 most have upheld clothed body searches of male inmates by 
female officers as “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.14  
These courts have considered the degree of nudity, the amount of 
observation, whether the guard would touch the prisoner, and 
whether the exclusion of the female guards promoted gender-based 
stereotypes.15  Balancing the state’s “need for the particular search” 
against the extent of the invasion suffered by the inmate, courts have 
generally found that the institutional concerns of the prison 
outweigh the intrusiveness of the searches.16 
There is only one case, Jordan v. Gardner,17 that has looked 
directly at the reverse situation: female inmates subjected to clothed 
body searches by male officers.  While the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found in favor of the female inmates in Jordan, it did so 
under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment.18  
In spite of the majority’s avoidance of a Fourth Amendment analysis, 
Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence in that case has sparked a debate 
regarding the appropriateness of the court’s analysis of cross-gender 
 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:161A-4 (2002). 
 13 See, e.g., Cornwell, 963 F.2d at 913-15 (finding that a Fourth Amendment claim 
is stated when an inmate is strip-searched outdoors before several female 
correctional officers after a prison uprising); Canedy, 16 F.3d at 184-88 (finding that a 
Fourth Amendment claim is stated when female prison guards are routinely allowed 
to conduct strip searches and observe male inmates “in various stages of undress”). 
 14 See, e.g., Grummett, 779 F.2d at 495-96 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation 
where correctional officers of the opposite gender conduct routine pat-down 
searches); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding reasonable a 
cross-gender pat-frisk policy in which female guards frisk male inmates ); Timm v. 
Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding policy allowing female guards 
to pat-frisk and view naked male prisoners reasonable). 
 15 See, e.g., Timm, 917 F.2d at 1099 (discussing relevant factors). 
 16 See, e.g., Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding a policy requiring 
strip searches of security unit prisoners when entering or leaving the unit or after 
meeting visitors justified because the prison operated under maximum security and 
the unit housed the most dangerous prison inmates); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 
78-79 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding a policy requiring random visual body-cavity searches 
justified by security problems, despite the inmates’ subjective expectations of bodily 
privacy); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding the subjection 
of prisoners to visual body-cavity searches in the general presence of other inmates 
and non-searching officers justified as part of an institution-wide shakedown 
following an increase in murders); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 69, 697, 700 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (finding that a visual strip-search of a prisoner is reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest in keeping drugs out of the prison).  In Thompson, the 
court found no Fourth Amendment violation in spite of the fact that guards directed 
prisoner to run his fingers around his gums after manipulating genitalia and 
conducted the searches in view of other prisoners.  Id. 
 17 986 F.2d 1521, 1533 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 18 Id. at 1522-23. 
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searches under the Eighth versus the Fourth Amendment.19  Little, 
however, has been said about the majority’s reluctance to distinguish 
Jordan from prior Fourth Amendment cases in which cross-gender 
searches of male inmates by female officers were upheld. 
This article explores the unwillingness of the Ninth Circuit to 
analyze cross-gender, clothed body searches under search and seizure 
law.  It demonstrates that a finding that the cross-gender pat-frisks in 
Jordan violated the Fourth Amendment would not have been 
inconsistent with Fourth Amendment case law because the plaintiffs 
in Jordan proved, based on statistical psychological evidence, an 
unprecedented level of harm resulting from the cross-gender 
searches. This harm renders the searches in Jordan “unreasonable” 
when balanced against the institutional concerns of the prison. 
The article begins with an overview of the application of the 
Fourth Amendment in prison, particularly in the context of cross-
gender searches.  Part II then summarizes the factual and legal 
findings of the Ninth Circuit in Jordan.  Part III addresses the 
majority’s reluctance to decide the female inmates’ Fourth 
Amendment claim.  Part IV distinguishes Jordan from the cases 
addressing clothed body searches of male inmates by female 
corrections officers on the basis of the intrusiveness of the search.  
Part V offers an explanation of the majority’s unwillingness to address 
the Fourth Amendment issues and addresses potential feminist 
concerns.  The article concludes with an explanation of how the 
court’s factual findings regarding the psychological harm caused by 
cross-gender pat-frisks of female inmates support a legal finding that 
the searches violate both the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. 
 
 19 See David J. Stollman, Comment, Jordan v. Gardner: Female Prisoners’ Rights to be 
Free From Random, Cross-Gender Clothed Body Searches, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877 (1994) 
(criticizing Jordan’s reliance on the Eighth Amendment and arguing that courts 
should instead analyze cross-gender pat-frisk cases under the Fourth Amendment); 
Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining The Privacy Rights of Women 
Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1 (1999) (criticizing Jordan’s majority and concurring opinions’ reliance on gender 
stereotypes in analyzing the search under the Eighth and Fourth amendments 
respectively); Lisa Krim, Essay, A Reasonable Woman’s Version of Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment: Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches of Women Prisoners, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 85 (1995) (arguing for review of cross-gender pat-frisks of female inmates under 
the Eighth Amendment using a “reasonable woman” standard). 
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I.  PRISONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Unlike free citizens, prisoners are not entitled to the 
Constitution’s full protection.20  The Supreme Court has declared 
that “imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many 
significant rights,”21 particularly when the exercise of those rights 
compromises a punitive objective.22  The Supreme Court has also 
made clear, however, that persons who have been convicted of crimes 
do not forfeit all of their rights under the Constitution when they 
pass through prison gates.23  No “iron curtain” separates prison 
inmates from constitutional protections.24  Rather, inmates retain 
“those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself 
or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.”25  For example, 
prisoners may not be subjected to invidious racial discrimination,26 
denied access to the courts,27 or subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment.28  They are entitled to due process of law29 and may 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.30  In short, while 
the Supreme Court has held that prison inmates retain some 
minimum level of Fourth Amendment rights,31 the scope of those 
 
 20 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (declaring that “[l]awful 
imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the 
ordinary citizen”). 
 21 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 545 (1979)). 
 22 See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (stating that judicial restraint and 
deference to prison authorities must temper federal courts’ consideration of 
prisoners’ constitutional claims). 
 23 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555  (“[T]hough [a prisoner’s] rights may be diminished by 
the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, [he] is not wholly 
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime.”); see 
generally Patrick J.A. McClain et al., Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1953 (1998) (discussing limited constitutional rights retained by prisoners, such as 
the rights of freedom of speech, association, and religion; the right to procedural 
due process; and the right to adequate assistance of counsel). 
 24 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56. 
 25 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523. 
 26 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curium). 
 27 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 28 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 29 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539. 
 30 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
 31 See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962) (confirming that convicted 
prisoners and pretrial detainees retain Fourth Amendment rights while 
incarcerated). 
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rights remains unclear.32 
A.  The Fourth Amendment in Prison 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”33  In cases not involving prisoners, determining whether a 
search of an individual violates the Fourth Amendment requires a 
two-step analysis.  First, a court must decide whether a person has a 
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”34  This 
requires a court to determine whether the individual has exhibited a 
subjective expectation of privacy, and whether society recognizes that 
expectation as reasonable.35  Second, a court must determine 
whether the governmental action is constitutional.36  To make this 
determination, a court must decide whether, in the particular 
context, the interests asserted by the state actors are reasonable when 
balanced against the individual’s privacy expectations.37 
Since prisoners have limited constitutional rights, courts do not 
apply this same inquiry to the analysis of their Fourth Amendment 
claims.  Instead, courts analyze a prisoner’s Fourth Amendment claim 
using the approach mandated by the Supreme Court in Turner v. 
Safely,38 a class action suit brought by inmates challenging two prison 
regulations relating to inmate-to-inmate mail correspondence and 
inmate marriages.39  In Turner, the Supreme Court refused to apply 
the strict scrutiny standard of review that the Eighth Circuit had used 
 
 32 See infra PART I.B. 
 33 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the 
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), rev’d on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). 
 34 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  In 
Katz, the Court disengaged the Fourth Amendment privacy analysis from a property-
based analysis, emphasizing that privacy attaches to people rather than to places.  Id. 
at 352-53; see also Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992) (using the Katz 
inquiry as the first step in its Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 35 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 36 See Covino, 967 F.2d at 77-78. 
 37 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 
(1989). 
 38 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 39 The first regulation limited correspondence between inmates at different 
institutions and the second regulation prohibited inmate marriages unless the prison 
superintendent approved the marriage due to “compelling reasons.”  Id. at 78.  The 
Court upheld the limitation on the inmate-to-inmate correspondence, but struck 
down the marriage restriction.  Id. at 88-93, 97-99. 
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to analyze male prisoners’ claims.40  Instead, it used a rational basis 
test,41 stating that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related 
to legitimate penological interests.”42  The Court concluded that 
when claims are evaluated under Turner, appropriate deference must 
be given to prison officials because the judiciary is “ill-equipped to 
deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration 
and reform.”43 
Before a court can analyze a prisoner’s Fourth Amendment 
claim under Turner, it must first consider whether prisoners have 
constitutionally-protected rights under the Fourth Amendment.44  
 
 40 See Turner v. Safely, 777 F.2d 1307, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 41 The rational basis test set forth in Turner has been the basis for review of most 
prisoners’ claims of constitutional violations by prison officials since 1987.  See James 
E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as the Social Construction of Reality: The Supreme Court 
and Prison Rules, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 161, 180-81 (2000) (noting that after Turner, the 
Supreme Court employed the rational basis test to uphold prison regulations 
restricting religious practices, prohibiting prisoners’ receipt of publications, and 
authorizing forced antipsychotic medication to a mentally competent inmate).  Prior 
to the Turner decision, the Court applied different levels of scrutiny to various 
challenged prison regulations and practices alleged to infringe on prisoners’ 
constitutional rights.  Compare Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) 
(invalidating regulations restricting the content of inmate correspondence under the 
“strict scrutiny” standard because of the implications for the free speech rights of 
those not incarcerated) with Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 
U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding regulations restricting activities of a prisoner labor 
union under a lower “reasonableness” standard due to the limitations on free 
association inherent in incarceration). 
 42 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  Although the Turner test appears to strike a balance 
between the inmates’ rights and prison’s institutional concerns, courts uphold many 
prison regulations under the rational-basis standard because of the current 
application of the four factors and the extreme deference afforded to prison 
administrators.  For a discussion of deference afforded to prison administrators, see 
supra note 16. 
 43 Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405).  Federal courts are 
generally reluctant to interfere with the internal administration of prisons.  See, e.g., 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 
561-63 (1974), for the proposition that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate 
deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.”); 
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
540-541 (1979), for the principle that courts should defer to the “expert judgment” 
of prison authorities); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (stating that 
courts should not assume that prison officials are insensitive to constitutional 
requirements or to the problems of achieving penal system goals); Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (reasoning that 
courts should give wide-ranging deference to decisions of prison officials). 
 44 Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that before 
turning to the Turner analysis the court must determine “how the inmate’s Fourth 
Amendment rights are infringed”).  If the court finds that prisoners have no such 
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This inquiry is not entirely straightforward because the Supreme 
Court has never addressed the issue of whether prisoners retain a 
right to bodily privacy or dignity in their persons.45  The Supreme 
Court has ruled that certain Fourth Amendment rights are 
extinguished upon confinement in prison.  Prisoners do not, for 
example, have a reasonable expectation of privacy within the 
confines of their cells46 and can be subjected to visual body-cavity 
inspections.47  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that 
the principal objective of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of 
individual privacy rather than the protection of property.48  The 
Court has also held that the Fourth Amendment protects against 
infringements of personal dignity49 and has stated that privacy and 
dignity interests are most acute with respect to the body.50  Taken 
together, these decisions suggest that if prisoners do retain any 
Fourth Amendment rights, they are limited. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s failure to make a clear 
pronouncement on the issue, most circuit courts have recognized 
that inmates do, in fact, retain a limited Fourth Amendment right to 
 
rights, Turner does not apply.  See id. 
 45 A Nebraska magistrate judge aptly observed: 
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically said that one has a 
protected privacy right to urinate, defecate, or bathe outside the 
viewing of a person of the opposite sex, or not to be touched in the 
genital area, even through clothing, by a member of the opposite sex, 
these things are so fundamental to personal dignity and self respect in 
this culture that I believe if presented with such issues, the Supreme 
Court would find one’s own body and its personal functions protected 
by the recognized privacy rights of unincarcerated citizens. 
Braasch v. Gunter, Nos CV83-L-459, CV83-l-682, 1985 WL 3530, at *10 (D. Neb. July 
15, 1985), overruled by Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 46 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (holding “[t]hat the Fourth 
Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell”). 
 47 Bell, 441 U.S. at 520, 560.  In Bell, the Supreme Court recognized that 
unclothed body searches or strip searches might be offensive.  Id.  Nevertheless, the 
Court held these searches were neither unreasonable nor cruel and unusual when 
done in a professional manner.  Id.  Although the Supreme Court held that body-
cavity searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it has not indicated 
that the gender of the guards conducting the searches is irrelevant.  See id. 
 48 See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (holding that tearing a 
mobile home from the ground constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure even 
though the seizure effected property instead of privacy interests, the fulcrum of 
Fourth Amendment protection). 
 49 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding 
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against 
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”). 
 50 Bell, 441 U.S. at 576-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“body-cavity searches . . . represent one of the most grievous offenses against 
personal dignity and common decency”). 
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bodily privacy.  For example, the Second Circuit has stated that it has 
little doubt “[t]hat society is prepared to recognize as reasonable the 
retention of a limited right of bodily privacy even in the prison 
context.”51  Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has held that it joins others in 
recognizing that a convicted prisoner maintains some reasonable 
expectations of privacy while in prison, even though those privacy 
rights may be less than those enjoyed by non-prisoners.52  The 
exception is the Seventh Circuit, which has held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect privacy interests within prison.53 
Assuming arguendo that a prisoner has some Fourth Amendment 
rights, a court must then determine whether the prison regulation is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.54  In Turner v. 
Safely, the Supreme Court identified four factors in determining the 
reasonableness of a prison regulation: 1) whether a “valid, rational 
connection” exists “between the prison regulation and the legitimate 
governmental interests” advanced to justify it;55 2) “whether there are 
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison 
inmates;”56 3) whether and to what extent accommodation of the 
asserted right will adversely affect guards, other inmates, and the 
allocation of prison resources generally;57 and 4) whether an obvious 
alternative to the regulation exists “that fully accommodates the 
prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.”58  
Although the Court rejected a “least restrictive alternative” test,59 the 
existence of easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is 
 
 51 Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 52 Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Fortner v. Thomas, 
983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to 
bodily privacy, which is obstructed when they are observed by the opposite sex in 
their living quarters).  In addition, the Tenth, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have each 
recognized such a right.  Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 745 n.13 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(noting several courts of appeals’ findings of a limited constitutional right to a 
prisoner’s bodily privacy). 
 53 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a prisoner’s 
due process rights are not violated by a cross-gender prison guard’s observation of 
his naked body); see also Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that “the Seventh Circuit stands alone in its peremptory declaration that 
prisoners do not retain a right to bodily privacy”). 
 54 See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). 
 55 Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
 56 Id. at 90. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 90-91. 
 59 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  Under a “least restrictive alternative” test, prison 
officials would be required to “set up and then shoot down every conceivable 
alternative method of accommodating” the asserted right.  Id. 
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an unreasonable, “‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”60 
The Turner factors must be applied in light of the type of 
constitutional violation involved and the circumstances of the 
particular case.61  Bell v. Wolfish offers guidance on how Turner is to be 
applied in “unreasonable” search cases: 
In each case [the test of reasonableness] requires a balancing of 
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal 
rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of 
the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 
conducted.62 
Thus, the more intrusive the search, the heavier the government’s 
burden of proving its reasonableness.63 
Applying these tests, the Supreme Court has concluded that strip 
searches and visual body-cavity searches do not violate inmates’ rights 
to be free from unreasonable searches because they are necessary to 
maintain security.64  It has also held that constant surveillance of 
prisoners is constitutionally permissible because institutional security 
needs outweigh prisoners’ privacy interests.65  Following the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in this area, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have affirmed the constitutionality of 
routine body-cavity and strip-searches on prisoners, according wide-
ranging deference to the expertise of prison officials in determining 
the appropriateness of these searches.66 
When, however, the basis of a challenge to a prison search is a 
gender difference between a guard and prisoner, the Supreme Court 
has provided little guidance to the lower federal courts.67  The 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 62 Id. 
 63 United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1978) (establishing the 
intrusiveness of the search as a key factor of the Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 64 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. 
 65 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (finding that institutional 
security requires a “close and continual surveillance of inmates”). 
 66 See Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188 
(5th Cir. 1994); Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs., 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1988); 
Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Rocchio, 132 F.3d 42 
(10th Cir. 1997). 
 67 When presented with the opportunity to address the constitutionality of cross-
gender searches, on four occasions the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to review 
the opinions of lower federal courts.  See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 852 (1997); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996); Tharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Corrs., 68 F.3d 223 
(8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1135 (1996); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th 
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Court’s silence on this issue leaves open the possibility that gender 
may affect the balance between prisoners’ privacy and the 
penological interests of an institution.68  Searches by opposite-sex 
guards may infringe upon inmates’ rights more than those by same-
sex guards.69  In addition, opposite-sex guards are not necessary to 
maintain security.  Thus, a prison’s use of opposite-sex guards may be 
found to violate constitutional rights to privacy unless the prison can 
show another legitimate goal besides maintaining security, such as 
promoting equal employment opportunity.70 
B.  Caselaw on Cross-Gender Pat-frisks 
Federal judges appear to be somewhat uncomfortable 
sanctioning searches conducted by guards of the opposite sex.  This 
discomfort is heightened when the search is highly intrusive, 
involving physical contact with breasts, genitalia, and anal areas.  
Nevertheless, the federal courts that have considered the 
constitutionality of cross-gender pat-frisks have generally held that 
while prisoners have a limited right to privacy, their interest in 
protecting bodily privacy is not as strong as the state’s interest in 
internal security or equal opportunity employment for correctional 
officers. 
For example, in Grummet v. Rushen,71 the Ninth Circuit upheld 
pat-down searches by female officers of male inmates that included 
 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983). 
 68 The searches at issue in Katz, Bell, and Hudson, the seminal Supreme Court 
cases, were not cross-gender searches.  The Court was therefore not required to 
address the legal significance of the gender of the guard and prisoner in either the 
main body or dicta of the opinions. 
 69 The majority of the courts that have analyzed the privacy side of the balancing 
test have concluded that when opposite-sex guards perform the touching and 
viewing necessary to maintain security, they infringe on inmates’ privacy rights more 
than if guards of the same gender performed the duties.  See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 471 
F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (concluding that when same-sex guards perform 
contact duties, they invade prisoner privacy less than when opposite-sex guards 
perform the same duties).  But see Griffin v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrs., 654 F. Supp. 
690, 703 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting as a stereotypical sexual characterization the 
argument that the viewing of an inmate while nude or performing bodily functions, 
by a member of the opposite sex, is intrinsically more odious than the viewing by a 
member of one’s own sex). 
 70 In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974), the Supreme Court indicated that 
prisoners retain constitutional rights that are “[n]ot inconsistent . . . with the 
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”  Since equal 
employment is not clearly a penological objective, courts may reject it as a legitimate 
reason for infringing on inmates’ rights. 
 71 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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the groin area.72  Analyzing these claims under both the Fourteenth 
and Fourth Amendment,73 the court concluded that the pat-down 
searches did not violate the privacy interests of the male inmates.74  
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court assumed that the male 
inmates retained the right to shield their naked bodies and genitals 
from members of the opposite sex, yet found that the state had 
“devised the least intrusive means to” further the state’s interest in 
prison security.75  Similarly, the court assumed, but did not find, that 
prisoners retained Fourth Amendment protections while 
incarcerated: specifically, a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
shielding their naked bodies and genitals from members of the 
opposite sex.76  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit upheld the prison 
regulations under the Fourth Amendment because it believed that 
security needs justified the pat-down searches.77  The court further 
found the cross-gender aspect of the searches “reasonable” because 
they were done briefly and professionally while inmates were fully 
clothed.78 
Applying the Turner standard, the Eighth Circuit held in Timm v 
Gunter that cross-gender, pat-down searches did not violate male 
inmates’ privacy rights.  The Court concluded that prohibiting female 
officers from conducting pat-down searches, which included the 
groin area of male inmates “[could] severely impede overall internal 
security.”79  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the limitation on 
female guards would create “resentment by male guards, tension 
among male and female employees, [and a] deterioration of 
morale.”80 
In Smith v. Fairman,81 the Seventh Circuit found that “inmates do 
have some right to avoid unwanted intrusions by persons of the 
opposite sex,”82 suggesting that this protection can be found in the 
Fourth Amendment or in the more general right to personal 
 
 72 Id. at 492. 
 73 See id. at  493 n.1. 
 74 Id. at 496. 
 75 Id. at 494. 
 76 See id. at 493. 
 77 Grummett, 779 F.2d at 494.  The court did not, however, indicate that the 
security of the institution depended on female officers conducting the searches.  See 
id. 
 78 Id. at 495. 
 79 Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d at 1100 n.10. 
 80 Id. 
 81 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 82 Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
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privacy.83  The court nevertheless upheld the prison’s policy of 
allowing female guards to conduct pat-down searches of male 
inmates, holding that the inmates’ privacy interests had been 
accommodated because the searches were limited so as not to include 
the groin area.84  The court implied, however, that had the searches 
included the genital area, a constitutional violation would have been 
found.85  One year later, in Madyun v. Franzen,86 the Seventh Circuit 
again ruled that a pat-down search performed by a female officer did 
not violate the inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights because the 
search did not require deliberate examination of the genital area.87 
In Michenfelder v. Sumner,88 the plaintiff, a male inmate, alleged 
that the policy of female guards viewing unclothed male prisoners 
during strip-searches was an unconstitutional infringement of 
prisoners’ privacy rights.89  The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, 
that infrequent and casual observation by female officers is “not so 
degrading as to warrant court interference.”90  The court reasoned 
that requiring men to replace female employees during strip searches 
would displace officers throughout the prison.91  Moreover, “the 
prison’s current allocation of responsibilities among male and female 
employees already represent[ed] an attempt to accommodate 
prisoners’ privacy concerns consistent with internal security needs 
and equal employment concerns.”92 
Although there is little consistency in the federal case law on 
cross-gender pat-frisks, there is a movement away from mutual 
accommodation of privacy and employment rights and an increasing 
tendency for courts to override prisoner privacy claims when the 
justification for a pat-search policy is institutional security or equal 
 
 83 Id. at 53-54. 
 84 Id. at 55.  Female officers were not permitted to conduct full searches and were 
given “explicit instructions not to search the genital area.”  Id. at 53. 
 85 Id. at 55 (distinguishing this case from a case that found a Fourth Amendment 
violation where female corrections officers performed full frisks of a male inmate’s 
anal and genital areas).  Given Judge Easterbrook’s very different analysis of 
prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights in more recent cases, such as Johnson v. Phelan, 
69 F.3d 144 (1995), it is safe to assume that Fairman would be decided differently 
today. 
 86 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 87 Id. at 957.  Again, given the Johnson decision, the Seventh Circuit would likely 
not be as generous today. 
 88 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 89 Id. at 329-30. 
 90 Id. at 334. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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employment opportunity.93  This trend is predicated on two beliefs: 
1) the opportunity for female officers to advance within the state’s 
correctional hierarchy is extremely important;94 and 2) the viewing or 
touching of men by women does not significantly harm men.95  
While, however, the degree of invasiveness of the cross-gender pat-
frisk is probative, it is not always determinative of the constitutionality 
of the search.96 
II.  JORDAN V. GARDNER 
On July 5, 1989, male guards at the WCCW began performing 
clothed body searches of female inmates that included the touching 
of the breast and genital areas.97  During that day, guards searched 
several inmates, one of whom suffered tremendous anguish.98  After 
reluctantly submitting to the search, this inmate “had to have her 
fingers pried loose from the bars she had grabbed during the search, 
and she vomited after returning to her cell block.”99 
That same day, the WCCW inmates filed a pro se complaint in the 
Western District of Washington requesting a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting male guards from performing random, clothed body 
searches on female prisoners.100  The inmates were granted a 
temporary restraining order.101  They were later granted a 
preliminary injunction and certified as a class.102 
After a bench trial, the district court held that the cross-gender 
searches at WCCW violated the female inmates’ First, Fourth, and 
Eighth Amendment rights.103  The district court concluded that: 
 
 93 See Teresa A. Miller, Sex Surveillance: Gender, Privacy & the Sexualization of Power 
in Prison, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 291, 297 (2000) (arguing that “driven by 
security concerns” courts have “favor[ed] statutorily derived employment rights over 
constitutionally derived privacy”). 
 94 See, e.g., Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 334 (recognizing prison’s legitimate interest 
in providing equal employment opportunities). 
 95 See, e.g., Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
females viewing male prisoners while naked is not degrading enough to warrant 
intervention by the courts). 
 96 See id. 
 97 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 98 Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Appellees’ Brief at 9, Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Nos. 
90-35307/90-35552). 
 103 Jordan v. Gardner, No. C89-339TB (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1990), rev’d, 953 F.2d 
1137 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and superseded en banc, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 46 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:031 
under the laws of the State of Washington and other states . . . 
some areas of the human body have more privacy attached to 
them than do other parts.  The standards of decency in society 
also recognize a right to privacy in the intimate parts of a human 
body.104 
Turning to the Fourth Amendment claim, the district court relied on 
Turner v. Safely and held that the cross-gender, clothed body searches 
were unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.105 
A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on all 
three grounds.106  The Ninth Circuit then granted an en banc 
rehearing of the case and vacated the panel decision.107  A majority of 
the judges affirmed the district court’s holding as it pertained to the 
Eighth Amendment, but only a plurality agreed on the Fourth 
Amendment grounds.108  Judge O’Scannlain, writing for four judges, 
refused to address the inmates’ First and Fourth Amendment claims 
after concluding that the cross-gender searches were unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment.109 
A.  The Ninth Circuit Majority Opinion 
The majority began its opinion by clarifying its reasons for 
declining to decide the case under the Fourth Amendment and 
instead proceeding under the Eighth Amendment.110  Judge 
O’Scannlain, writing for the majority, noted that courts have not yet 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects inmates from cross-
gender, clothed body searches,111 whereas the right to be free from 
“unwarranted infliction of pain” is clearly established.112  Second, the 
majority reasoned that the evidence put forward by the inmates 
focused on the pain inflicted by the cross-gender, clothed body 
searches, rather than on their expectations of privacy.113  Lastly, the 
majority found that once it had affirmed the district court’s decision 
on Eighth Amendment grounds, it was unnecessarily duplicative to 
 
 104 Id. at 9. 
 105 Id. at 12. 
 106 953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and superceded en banc, Jordan v. Gardner, 
986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 107 Jordan v. Gardner, 968 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting rehearing en banc). 
 108 See Jordan, 986 F.2d 1521. 
 109 Id. at 1524 n.3. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 1524-25. 
 112 Id. at 1525. 
 113 Id. at 1524. 
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address the inmates’ Fourth Amendment claim.114 
In analyzing the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim, the court 
concluded that sufficient evidence had been presented to the district 
court to meet the constitutional standard for a finding of “infliction 
of pain.”115  The court noted that the female inmates in the 
institution had histories of sexual and physical abuse by men, and 
that experts support the conclusion that women react differently than 
men to unwanted intimate touching by the opposite sex.116  The court 
also found compelling expert testimony stating that female inmates 
who had prior histories of abuse were likely to be re-victimized by the 
unwilling submission to intimate contact of their breasts and genitals 
by men.117  Thus, the high probability that survivors of abuse would 
suffer severe psychological injury and emotional pain and suffering 
led the court to find that the random cross-gender searches caused 
sufficient pain to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 
The court next determined that this infliction of pain was 
unnecessary and wanton because the security of the institution did 
not depend upon the cross-gender aspect of the search.118  
Furthermore, the court found that the inmates had met their burden 
of establishing deliberate indifference on the part of the 
superintendent, by showing that in implementing the cross-gender 
search policy he had disregarded the concerns of his advisors 
regarding the possible psychological trauma to the inmates.119 
In order to reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit had to 
distinguish Jordan from Grummett v. Rushen,120 a Ninth Circuit case 
that had permitted similar cross-gender searches of male inmates by 
female guards.  It was able to do so for two reasons.  First, Grummett 
involved searches that were much less invasive.121  Second, the male 
inmates were unable to establish a finding of pain under the Eighth 
Amendment because they could point to nothing more than 
“momentary discomfort caused by the search procedures.”122  
According to Judge O’Scannlain, “[n]othing in Grummett indicates 
 
 114 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525. 
 115 Id. at 1526. 
 116 Id. at 1525-26. 
 117 Id. at 1526. 
 118 Id. at 1528. 
 119 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1528. 
 120 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 121 See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524 (noting that the frequency and scope of the female 
guards’ pat-down searches of male inmates in Grummett were significantly less invasive 
than the ones at issue before the court). 
 122 Id. at 1526. 
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that the men had particular vulnerabilities that would cause the cross-
gender clothed body searches to exacerbate symptoms of pre-existing 
mental conditions.”123  In contrast, the female inmates at WCCW 
could show on the basis of expert psychological and anthropological 
testimony that they were traumatized by cross-gender searches.124  
The majority concluded that it was proper to consider this gender 
difference in evaluating the objective part of the women’s claim—
whether the searches constituted an “infliction of pain.”125 
B.  Judge Reinhardt’s Concurrence 
Although Judge Reinhardt believed that the cross-gender search 
policy in Jordan violated both the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, he 
suggested in his concurrence that the case should have been decided 
on Fourth, rather than Eighth Amendment grounds.126  Judge 
Reinhardt offered several reasons why a Fourth Amendment analysis 
is preferable.  First, Judge Reinhardt viewed the conduct at issue as 
clearly a search and noted that “[t]he ‘explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection’ with respect to ‘searches’ of ‘persons’ is, 
without doubt, the Fourth Amendment, not the more general Eighth 
Amendment.”127  Second, Judge Reinhardt asserted that the Fourth 
Amendment is easier to apply than the Eighth Amendment, 
suggesting that while the Fourth Amendment requires only an 
objective inquiry, the Eighth Amendment requires a more 
complicated subjective inquiry.128  Third, Judge Reinhardt reasoned 
that it would be more efficient to apply the Fourth Amendment 
because any search that violated the Eighth Amendment would be an 
“unreasonable” search under the Fourth Amendment.129 
Next, Judge Reinhardt examined the Fourth Amendment rights 
retained by prisoners.  The judge reasoned that in addition to 
protecting privacy, the Fourth Amendment “also protects persons 
against infringements of bodily integrity and personal dignity. . . .  It 
 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1540-41 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 127 Id. at 1541 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).  Judge Reinhardt challenged the 
majority’s application of the Eighth Amendment on the grounds that the 
fundamental conduct at issue in Jordan was the search, not the pain inflicted by the 
search.  See id. at 1540 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“Pain is simply an incident of the 
unreasonable searches, not, as Judge O’Scannlain would have it, ‘the gravamen of 
the inmates’ charge.’”). 
 128 Id. at 1541 n.16 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 129 Id. at 1542 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
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is the privacy and dignitary interests of the female inmates that are 
violated here.”130  Thus, Judge Reinhardt concluded that random, 
cross-gender, clothed body searches implicate a prison inmate’s 
rights of privacy and dignity.131 
Once Judge Reinhardt recognized that female inmates do, in 
fact, possess a right to bodily privacy, he analyzed their claim under 
the four factors enumerated in Turner.  First, considering prison 
administrators’ assertions that prison security interests and guards’ 
equal employment rights justified these searches, he found that “the 
connection between any legitimate penological interest and cross-
gender searches [was] tenuous.”132  Second, he recognized that since 
inmates cannot escape these searches by virtue of their incarceration, 
the cross-gender search policy left them with “no means of protecting 
their bodies against unreasonable searches.”133  Third, Judge 
Reinhardt analyzed the impact that the accommodation of the 
inmates’ constitutional rights would have on other inmates and 
found that “[h]ere, there will, of course, be no adverse effect of any 
kind on other inmates if female guards instead of male guards 
conduct the body searches . . . .”134  Finally, he found that an obvious, 
easy alternative was available: the prison could use only female guards 
to perform these searches.135  Although this alternative would require 
administrative adjustments, these adjustments would be “relatively 
insignificant, both in themselves and when weighed against the 
constitutional interests at stake.”136 
In applying the Bell balancing test, Judge Reinhardt addressed 
the two interests that prison administrators advanced in support of 
the cross-gender, clothed body searches, namely prison security and 
guards’ equal employment rights.137  Judge Reinhardt rejected the 
prison administrators’ security argument because the record showed 
that the injunction imposed by the district court, which had since 
enjoined the prison from implementing its cross-gender pat-frisk 
policy, did not impair security in any way.138  Judge Reinhardt found 
that the government’s additional argument that barring male guards 
from conducting random searches would require adjustments “of 
 
 130 Id. at 1534 n.7 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
 131 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1534 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 132 Id. at 1536 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 1536-37 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 136 Id. at 1537 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 137 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1537-39 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
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staff schedules and job responsibilities, and the overriding of the bid 
system in the collective bargaining agreement” also lacked merit.  
The judge noted that prison authorities had not changed a single 
guard’s job during the injunction period.139 
Next, Judge Reinhardt analyzed the invasion of personal rights 
engendered by the searches, agreeing with the district court’s 
determination “that an unknown number of” female inmates would 
suffer substantial harm from cross-gender searches.140  Judge 
Reinhardt completed his Fourth Amendment analysis by balancing 
the prison officials’ interests against the harm inflicted on the 
inmates.141  As a result, Judge Reinhardt found that the cross-gender, 
clothed body search policy failed the Bell v. Wolfish test because “the 
harm the policy inflict[ed] on the inmates and the injury it [did] to 
their constitutional rights” significantly outweighed the prison 
administration’s interests.142 
C.  Judge Trott’s Dissent 
In dissent, Judge Trott addressed the question of which Eighth 
Amendment standard of wantonness to apply in Jordan.143  First, he 
noted that the majority’s opinion would cause several problems, such 
as the creation of  “a special class of untouchable prisoners” by 
exempting any previously sexually abused prisoner, whether female 
or male, from random pat-frisks “by a person of the gender of the 
prisoner’s abuser.”144  Fearful that too many prisoners would qualify 
for such protection, he applied the malice standard, a more difficult 
burden for prisoners to meet.145  Judge Trott concluded that the 
inmates’ failed to prove the “wanton” element of an Eighth 
Amendment violation,146 because Superintendent Vail had not acted 
maliciously or sadistically, but rather had acted in good faith when he 
 
 139 Id. at 1539 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1540 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1558 (Trott, J., dissenting).  The Supreme Court has 
outlined two different “wanton” standards.  In cases in which a prison official’s 
decision does not conflict with competing administrative concerns, the deliberate-
indifference standard applies.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) 
(holding that prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs 
after suffering an injury during the course of prison work would constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment and violate the Eighth Amendment).  In excessive force cases, 
the malice standard applies.  Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). 
 144 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1566 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
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implemented the cross-gender searches.147 
D.  Judge Wallace’s Dissent 
Chief Judge Wallace’s dissent followed Judge Trott’s reasoning 
in all but one respect.148  Chief Judge Wallace disagreed with Judge 
Reinhardt’s Fourth Amendment analysis, reasoning that it 
impermissibly combined the balancing test from Bell v. Wolfish with 
the four Turner factors.149  According to Chief Judge Wallace, because 
Turner had essentially overruled Bell, such balancing was 
inappropriate.150 
III.  THE MAJORITY’S RELUCTANCE TO DECIDE THE INMATES’ FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CLAIM 
The Jordan majority justified its decision not to decide the female 
inmates’ Fourth Amendment claim by questioning the extent to 
which prisoners retain a right to bodily privacy,151 despite the Ninth 
Circuit’s previous recognition of such a right.152  In its brief discussion 
of Fourth Amendment precedent, the court did not address whether 
searches of female inmates by male guards could be differentiated 
from searches of male inmates by female guards.  The failure to 
discuss gender with respect to the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 
claim is curious for a number of reasons.  First, both the district court 
and a panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of a gender 
difference and reached opposite conclusions with respect to its 
significance.153  Second, the majority gave great consideration to 
gender in its analysis of the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim.154  
Third, some of the relevant case law on cross-gender searches 
acknowledges the differential effect that such searches may have on 
 
 147 Id. at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
 148 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1566-67 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 1566-67 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529 (1979); Turner v. Safely, 
482 U.S. 78, 89-91(1987)); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91. 
 150 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1567 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). 
 151 Id. at 1524-25 (“Although the inmates here may have protected privacy 
interests in freedom from cross-gender clothed body searches, such interests have 
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 152 See, e.g., Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333 (“We recognize that incarcerated 
prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.”); Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 
491, 494 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that “the right of privacy is a fundamental right”). 
 153 See Jordan v. Gardner, No. C89-339TB (W.D. Wash. Feb 28, 1990); Jordan v. 
Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and superseded en banc, 986 F.2d 
1521(9th Cir. 1993). 
 154 See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526. 
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women.155  Therefore it would not have been inconsistent for the 
Ninth Circuit, in its analysis of the reasonableness of the cross-gender 
searches at issue in Jordan, to have considered how the gender of the 
inmates influenced their subjective experiences of the pat-frisks. 
A.  Conflicting Considerations of Gender in Earlier Jordan Decisions 
A panel of the Ninth Circuit found in 1992 that cross-gender 
searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was 
“no principled way to distinguish Grummett,” an earlier Ninth Circuit 
case, which “rejected a constitutional challenge to a prison policy that 
permitted female guards to perform pat-searches of clothed male 
inmates and occasionally view naked inmates.”156  Although the panel 
justified its position with several factual comparisons between the two 
cases, it gave no consideration to what the district court found was 
the most significant fact distinguishing this case from Grummett—the 
extreme psychological effects of the searches on women who have 
histories of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of men.157  
Because the two prior decisions in Jordan reflect alternative 
perspectives on whether the case is distinguishable from precedent 
on the basis of the differential psychological effect of the searches on 
female inmates, one would expect the Ninth Circuit to have 
addressed the issue when it reheard the case en banc.  However, in the 
en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit  remained silent on the question 
of a gender distinction and determined that Grummett and 
Michenfelder did not control.158  The court reasoned that the 
frequency and scope of the searches in those cases were “significantly 
less invasive.”159  While one can presume that the gender of the 
inmates in Jordan factored into the court’s Fourth Amendment 
 
 155 See, e.g., Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp.2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting 
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analysis of the intrusiveness of the searches, the majority did not 
explicitly make this point.160  The majority raised the significance of 
the inmates’ gender only in the context of the inmates’ Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
 
B.  The Majority’s Gender-Based Analysis of “Pain” Under the Eighth 
Amendment 
The Ninth Circuit, in determining whether cross-gender, 
clothed body searches constituted an objectively cruel and unusual 
condition of confinement, considered the psychological impact of 
the cross-gender searches from the perspective of the female 
inmates.161  The court paid particular attention to the prevalence of 
sexual abuse histories among the female inmate population, noting 
that: 
The record in the case, including the depositions of several 
inmates . . . describes the shocking histories of verbal, physical, 
and, in particular, sexual abuse endured by many of the inmates 
prior to their incarceration at WCCW.  For example, [one 
inmate], who gave live trial testimony, described rapes by 
strangers (twice) and by husbands or boyfriends.  She described 
how she had been beaten by various men in her life.  Two 
deprived her of adequate food; one pushed her out of a moving 
car.  [Her] story is not unique.  Eighty-five percent of the inmates 
report a history of serious abuse to WCCW counselors, including 
rapes, molestations, beatings, and slavery.162 
Relying on a Ninth Circuit sexual harassment case, Ellison v. Bradley,163 
the court found that “because women are disproportionately victims 
of rape and sexual assault,” they may respond differently than men in 
situations that are sexually charged.164  The court reasoned that since 
men and women are vulnerable in different ways, the severity and 
pervasiveness of sexual harassment should be evaluated from the 
victim’s perspective.165  Thus, the court held that due to the 
“differences in the experiences of men and women with regard to 
sexuality,”166 the cross-gender nature of the searches caused an 
unconstitutional level of “pain” for all female inmates, even those 
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who did not have a history of sexual abuse.167 
By reaching the conclusion that the female inmates at WCCW 
may suffer harm if subjected to intrusive, clothed body searches 
conducted by male guards, the court was able to distinguish prior 
case law.  The court noted that similar searches of male prisoners by 
female guards had not been shown to cause the same level of 
psychological harm.168  In Grummett, for example, the court asserted 
that the male “inmates had not shown sufficient evidence of pain” or 
likelihood of psychological trauma as a result of the searches “to 
make out a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.”169  Thus, the 
majority reasoned that because the precedent was based solely on a 
male prisoner’s reaction to being searched by a female guard, which 
does not raise the same societal and constitutional concerns as the 
touching of a woman by a man, it was inapposite.170  By explicitly 
weighing the significance of gender, the court was able to reach a 
conclusion contrary to controlling precedent.171 
The consideration of gender when analyzing whether conditions 
of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment is not 
improper under current Eighth Amendment doctrine.172  “The 
Eighth Amendment is supposed to protect all prisoners, regardless of 
gender, from cruel and unusual punishment in conditions of 
confinement.”173  If one accepts the basic assumption that cognitive 
perceptions of men and women sometimes differ, then the 
experience of incarceration for men and women should also differ.  
As a result, the “objective” part of the test for cruel and unusual 
punishment must take into account the perceptions of both men and 
women.174  An inquiry that fails to consider gender differences would 
be based on male experiences and would therefore lose its 
objectivity.175  Thus, the test for cruel and unusual punishment must 
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properly measure the psychological harm to female inmates, as well 
as men. 
The Ninth Circuit is certainly not the only court that recognized 
the importance of distinguishing the needs of men and women in a 
legal context.176  Evidence of how women’s perceptions can differ 
from men’s perceptions can be found in sexual harassment law.  
Hostile environment doctrine, for example, begins from an 
understanding of the way in which women and men are likely to 
experience differently practices challenged as sexual harassment.177  
For example, although many women hold positive attitudes about 
consensual sex,178 “their greater physical and social vulnerability to 
sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual encounters.”179  This 
perspective is also consistent with feminist scholarship in several areas 
of the criminal law that asks advocates and judges to adopt the 
perspective of the woman (usually the victim) in formulating and 
adjudicating the elements of a crime.180  In State v. Wanrow,181 for 
 
THINKING OF WOMEN’S LIVES 134-37 (1991); Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience 
and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 23, 32 (1989). 
 176 See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(acknowledging that “men and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended 
by different behavior”). 
 177 In sexual harassment cases, courts have routinely used a gender-sensitive 
reasonable person standard in assessing whether workplace conditions represent a 
hostile or abusive environment.  See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reiterating that the “critical issue” in harassment 
cases is “whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or 
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”). 
 178 Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1205 (1989). 
 179 Id.; see also BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 47-54 (1985).  Barbara 
Gutek’s empirical investigation of sex in the workplace reveals that women are more 
likely to regard a sexual encounter — verbal or physical — as coercive.  Id.  They are 
less likely to view such encounters as flattering and more likely to see them as signs of 
the virility of the perpetrator.  Id.  In contrast, men are less likely to regard such 
conduct as harassing, and more likely to view it as a flattering reflection of their 
attributes.  Id.  Men are also more likely to perceive such encounters as mutually 
desired, whereas women are more apt to regard the encounters as desired only by 
the more powerful, initiating party.  Id. 
 180 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091-94 (1986) (arguing that 
“[i]n rape, the male standard defines a crime committed against women,” and 
urging revision of standards used for adjudicating force and resistance to reflect 
women’s perspectives); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex 
Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 630-38 (1980) (arguing 
that in cases involving homicide by battered women legal rules governing the 
reasonableness of self-defense evaluate women’s conduct by a male standard but 
should reflect the perspective of the battered woman). 
 181 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977). 
 56 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:031 
example, the Washington State Supreme Court allowed the use of a 
“battered woman” defense, noting: 
Until such time as the effects of that history are eradicated, care 
must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford 
women the right to have their conduct judged in light of the 
individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex 
discrimination.182 
In fact, in the majority of jurisdictions, juries are instructed to use a 
reasonableness standard, which includes the defendant’s individual 
subjective experiences.183  Thus, courts should likewise measure the 
psychological harm women suffer when subjected to unwanted 
sexualized touching by male security guards by how women perceive 
the harm. 
C.  Courts’ Acknowledgment of the Differential Effect of Cross-Gender 
Searches on Women 
The plight of women in prison has become a growing societal 
concern in the past twenty years as the number of incarcerated 
women has increased dramatically.184  Consequently, courts and state 
legislators are beginning to recognize that female inmates have 
unique needs.185  In addressing the legal claims of female inmates, 
the courts have, for the most part, applied standards developed 
within the context of the experiences of male prisoners.186  Yet, in the 
application of these standards, some attention has been paid to the 
differential effect of such policies on women and the significance of 
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the gender of the inmates and guards.187 
For example, in Forts v. Ward,188 female inmates incarcerated at 
New York State’s Bedford Hills Correctional Facility claimed that the 
policy of assigning male guards to the prison’s living and sleeping 
corridors, which included the areas where women showered, violated 
their right to privacy because they would be “involuntarily exposed to 
view while partially or completely unclothed . . . .”189  The district 
court found no reason to ban male guards from assignment in the 
housing corridors during the day because the prison permitted 
inmates to cover their cell door windows for up to fifteen minutes 
while dressing.190  The court, however, found that the assignment of 
male guards to the corridors during the night, when the prison 
prohibited inmates from covering their windows, violated the 
inmates’ right of privacy.191  The lower court also found that installing 
screens in the shower facilities could easily correct invasions of 
privacy that occurred while inmates were showering.192  On appeal, 
the Second Circuit overturned the removal of male guards from 
nighttime shifts, holding that the exclusion was unjustifiable gender-
based employment discrimination.193  The court reasoned that the 
prison could accommodate the privacy rights of female prisoners by 
providing appropriate sleepwear and by allowing the women to cover 
their cell door for fifteen minutes during the evening just as they are 
permitted to do during the day time.194  The Ninth Circuit has not 
made similar accommodations when male prisoners have asserted 
their right to be free from cross-gender surveillance.195  Thus, by 
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allowing female prisoners to maintain a greater degree of modesty 
than had generally been afforded to male prisoners, the Second 
Circuit implicitly acknowledged the unique needs of women in 
prison.196 
In Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services,197 
male guards challenged their exclusion from surveillance posts within 
a women’s prison.  The Seventh Circuit held that the department of 
corrections had not established a sufficient basis to justify a gender-
based exclusion because it had complied with the policies set forth in 
Forts v. Ward.198  The court found that the existing prison policies 
provided sufficient opportunity, through the use of curtains, shower 
doors, and privacy cards, for women prisoners to shield themselves 
from male officers.199  It is notable, however, that the Wisconsin 
system did not provide male prisoners the same opportunity for 
privacy from cross-gender viewing.200  Thus, the court did not reach 
the same result with respect to the privacy interests of female 
prisoners subject to cross-gender surveillance as it had with the rights 
of male prisoners. 
The defendants in Torres also argued that the assignment of male 
guards to the women’s unit would undermine the prisoners’ 
rehabilitation because the women had suffered physical and/or 
sexual abuse at the hands of men.201  The trial court and initial 
appellate court opinions refused to accept this argument because the 
defendants did not present objective evidence to support their 
theory.202  An en banc panel vacated the appellate decision and 
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reversed and remanded the trial court order and judgment.203  The 
Seventh Circuit held that the trial court had applied too strict a 
requirement of empirical evidence,204 acknowledging that it is socially 
accepted wisdom that “the presence of unrelated males in living 
spaces where intimate bodily functions take place is a cause of stress 
to females.”205 
In Coleman v. Vasquez,206 a female inmate placed in a special unit 
for victims of sexual abuse filed a Section 1983 action against prison 
officials alleging that she was sexually abused by a male guard, and 
challenging the constitutionality of the prison’s cross-gender pat-
searches.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the 
complaint did not allege a cause of action under the Fourth 
Amendment since the Eighth Amendment is the “explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection” for alleged infringements of 
prisoners’ rights.207  The district court denied the motion, rejecting as 
a matter of law the suggestion that an inmate in the given 
circumstance has no claim under the Fourth Amendment.208  
Acknowledging that the defendants may be able to prove at trial that 
the prison conducted the searches “pursuant to a constitutionally 
valid policy,”209 the court refused to decide on the pleadings alone 
whether the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right was “clearly 
established.”210  The court stressed the need for further factual 
development on the specific “pat-search policy, the justification for its 
adoption, the frequency with which inmates in the Sexual Trauma 
Unit are subject to pat-searches, and the other [Turner factors].”211  
Although the court did not reach this ultimate issue, it carefully 
distinguished the situation in which an inmate has “particular 
vulnerabilities” due to her sexual abuse history from the numerous 
cases in other jurisdictions allowing pat-searches by guards of the 
opposite sex.212 
The gender of the inmates in each case clearly influenced the 
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courts’ reasoning in Forts, Torres, and Coleman.  The court deemed 
appropriate increased protection for women on the basis of their 
experiences as victims of sexual abuse at the hands of males.  This 
consideration of gender difference is consistent with the holding in 
Jordan that the female inmates suffered “pain” when subjected to 
intrusive clothed body searches performed by male guards. 
IV.  THE RELATIVE UNINTRUSIVENESS OF CROSS-GENDER SEARCHES OF 
MALE INMATES 
While some courts have acknowledged that pat-down searches 
are indeed offensive,213 they nevertheless justify their findings that 
searches of male inmates by female officers are reasonable on the 
basis of the relatively unintrusive nature of the challenged conduct.214  
In Michenfelder v. Sumner,215 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that 
because the searches were merely visual and involved no touching, 
they were distinguishable from those held to be unreasonable by the 
First Circuit in Bonitz v. Fair.216  In Bonitz, police officers conducted 
contact body-cavity searches of female inmates without medical 
personnel, in a non-hygienic manner, and “in the presence of male 
officers.”217  Thus, the relative unintrusiveness of the searches at issue 
in Michenfelder made them more acceptable. 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in Smith v. Fairman,218 held that by 
instructing female guards to exclude the genital area on male 
inmates when conducting frisks, the defendants “afforded plaintiff 
whatever privacy right” to which he may be entitled.219  While the 
Ninth Circuit embraced York’s concern about shielding one’s naked 
body from the view of persons of the opposite gender,220 it 
nevertheless held in Grummett that the search did not violate this 
limited privacy right because the viewing was occasional, the clothed 
pat-down searches did “not involve intimate contact with an inmate’s 
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body, [and] . . . the female guards conducted themselves in a 
professional manner.”221 
The District Court of Oregon in Bagley v. Watson222 articulated a 
standard for determining the extent to which cross-gender search 
policies impinge on a male prisoner’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.223  In holding that male prisoners did not suffer any 
constitutional harm by being viewed or searched by female guards, 
the court relied upon expert testimony that described the possible 
reason for the male prisoners’ claims of harm: 
According to Kissel and Siedel, the majority of men who claim 
that having women in the housing units constitutes an invasion of 
their privacy are, upon closer inspection of their complaints, 
merely complaining about the inconvenience caused by having to 
maintain their privacy, largely, as they see it, for the needs of the 
women officers. . . .  It is my belief that it is misleading to label 
concern with this inconvenience with women ‘invading 
privacy.’224 
The court therefore held that while men may prefer to be searched 
or viewed by male guards, “the indignity perceived by some male 
inmates . . . do[es] not justify discrimination against women in 
employment so as to constitute a BFOQ exception”—a bona fide 
occupational qualification justifying the discriminatory employment 
practice under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.225  Thus, the Bagley 
court reasoned that while society is prepared to recognize men’s 
interest in bodily privacy, this interest is de minimis when compared to 
the employment rights of female officers.226  The court made clear, 
however, that its opinion was limited to the rights of male prisoners, 
explicitly stating that male guards searching female prisoners was a 
different issue.227  The distinction drawn by the court suggests that 
the harm imposed when men search women may be more significant 
than when women search men and therefore merits greater 
consideration when weighed against the employment rights of male 
guards. 
The searches at issue in the Jordan case were significantly more 
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intrusive than those in prior cases, because in all of the cases 
considered by the Ninth Circuit the male guards did not touch the 
female inmates’ breasts, buttocks, or genital areas.228  Likewise, none 
of the plaintiffs in prior cases had shown on the basis of statistical 
psychological evidence that cross-gender searches could cause 
psychological trauma.  The fact that gender may influence whether 
an inmate experiences a search as overly intrusive requires courts to 
re-examine the balance previously struck wherein courts accorded 
less protection to the privacy rights of male inmates than to the equal 
employment rights of female prison guards. 
V.  ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE JORDAN MAJORITY’S FOURTH 
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The absence of any mention of gender with respect to the 
inmates’ Fourth Amendment claim in the Jordan opinion indicates 
that there was more to the court’s careful reluctance to reach the 
Fourth Amendment issues than the opinion suggests.  While it is 
impossible to know for certain why the majority preferred the Eighth 
Amendment to the Fourth Amendment, it may have been concerned 
about the legal and societal implications of recognizing a 
constitutional right for women that had not previously been 
recognized for men.  It may have also thought that to use societal 
expectations as the standard for evaluating privacy expectations 
would have undermined Title VII’s mandate that stereotypes not 
limit employment opportunities.229  One theorist, Rebecca Jurado, 
has explicitly voiced such concern.230  She argues that “courts’ 
reliance on the fact that women are victims of rape, as well as . . . the 
societal notion that any touching of a woman is sexual misconduct,” 
has imbued women with a greater need for privacy than men.231  
According to Jurado, the court’s reliance on this information 
supports the notion that there is an essential nature to all women—
namely, that all women are potential victims.232  In Jurado’s view, the 
rights of women should instead be “founded upon their strengths 
and experiences, not in continuing stereotypes that limit their role to 
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that of victims.”233 
The group of feminist legal theorists known as equal treatment 
advocates have voiced the more general fear that by focusing on 
women’s differences the legal system will exacerbate discrimination 
against women.234  They argue that by using a “special” standard for 
women, the courts perpetuate traditional gender imagery of men as 
aggressive actors and women as passive victims.235  While I recognize 
that my argument emphasizes that women have been victimized by 
sexualized repression, I would respond to such criticism as Catherine 
MacKinnon has: “I am merely telling it as it is.”236 
Contrary to what Jurado and possibly the Jordan majority 
thought, the consideration of gender with respect to the inmates’ 
Fourth Amendment claim would not have necessitated the 
recognition of a greater right to privacy for women.  Nor would it 
have required the articulation of a separate standard for women.  All 
that was needed was for the court, when it balanced the limited 
privacy rights of all inmates, to have analyzed the intrusiveness of the 
searches from the perspective of women who have most likely been 
abused at the hands of men.  A finding that WCCW’s cross-gender 
policy violated the Fourth Amendment would merely have meant that 
for this population of female inmates, the psychological harm caused 
by these searches made them “unreasonable.” 
Pat-frisks of intimate body parts are intrusive and degrading to 
inmates in all contexts.  When, however, a male guard searches a 
female inmate’s body, a woman is apt to experience not only the 
degradation of having the most intimate parts of her body exposed or 
explored, but also fear that the male guard will abuse his power in 
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the situation and sexually abuse her.237  The fear is even more acute 
for those who have suffered past abuse.238  The extreme invasiveness 
of these searches makes the state’s burden of establishing that these 
searches are reasonably necessary to accommodate a legitimate 
penological interest — and that there is no realistic alternative to 
accomplish the same goal — much harder to meet.  Constitutional 
theorist Akhil Amar has called this idea the proportionality principle, 
arguing that more serious intrusions require more weighty 
justifications.239 
Under Fourth Amendment law, the permissibility of a given 
intrusion turns on its “reasonableness” under particular 
circumstances.240  The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that 
the concept of “reasonableness,” must take into account the common 
sense of ordinary people.241  Searches that “create opportunities for 
sexual oppression, harassment, or embarrassment” generally offend 
basic notions of morality.242  Therefore, common sense tells us that 
they cannot be “reasonable” in the ordinary sense of the word.  How 
can a search that is adjudged to cause a sufficient level of “pain” as to 
constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth 
Amendment be considered “reasonable”?  A policy allowing men to 
touch women in a sexualized manner capable of triggering a 
traumatic response must therefore be “unreasonable” under the 
Fourth Amendment—unreasonable because it reinforces gender 
subordination and offends basic values and concepts of human 
dignity.243 
 
 237 This fear of abuse is based on widespread instances of sexual abuse in women’s 
prisons.  See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 1-2, finding that male 
correctional officers often misuse their search authority to have inappropriate sexual 
contact with female prisoners.  See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, at 55-
56. 
 238 See Heney & Kristiansen, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 239 Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and the Future: Terry and Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1120 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court 
focused in Terry v. Ohio on both the “depth and breadth of an intrusion”). 
 240 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 241 See Jerome Atrens, A Comparison of Canadian and American Constitutional Law 
Relating to Search and Seizure, 1 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 29, 35 (1994) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on normative reasonableness or what “the ordinary 
person has come to expect in society” in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); 
Amar, supra note 239, at 1120 (common sense understanding should inform “the 
interpretation of a Constitution that speaks in the name of ordinary people”). 
 242 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
808-809 (1994); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (stating that “the degree of 
community resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant”). 
 243 See Amar, supra note 242, at 41. 
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Rather than suggesting that women have a greater right to 
bodily privacy than men, I am arguing that privacy analysis under the 
Fourth Amendment must be highly contextualized and grounded in 
fundamental respect for human dignity and bodily integrity.  For 
example, for the particular population of women subjected to the 
Jordan policy, the psychological harm caused by cross-gender searches 
is “unreasonable” when balanced against the institutional concerns of 
the prison.  That women’s claims should be highly contexualized 
does not prevent men from demonstrating Fourth Amendment 
violations when appropriate; if male inmates can show a comparable 
level of psychological harm as a result of cross-gender pat-frisks, then 
they too should be able to sustain a claim under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Critics may claim that consideration of the subjective 
experiences of women will impose a huge burden on the courts.  By 
focusing, however, on the intrusiveness of the searches, the courts 
already employ a fact-specific approach. 
CONCLUSION 
One way out of this quagmire would be for courts to recognize a 
general right to bodily integrity for both free and incarcerated 
individuals.  Such a view flows out of the Ninth Circuit’s expressed 
concern in York v. Story244 about privacy in the naked body.  “The 
desire to shield one’s unclothed figure from the view of strangers, 
and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by 
elementary self-respect and personal dignity.”245  While agreeing with 
the basic nature of this aspect of privacy, some courts distinguish York 
because it involved a female crime victim rather than a prisoner.  
Thus, until society is ready to recognize that prisoners are individuals 
worthy of the same constitutional protections as free citizens, the 
courts must continue to consider all relevant contextual factors when 
determining the reasonableness of a cross-gender body search under 
the Fourth Amendment.  In the situation of male corrections officers 
searching female inmates, this means that the courts must take into 
account the subjective experience of unwanted sexualized touching 
from the perspective of a woman, who may or may not have been 
abused prior to incarceration.  Although privacy is genderless, 
concern for symmetry in the treatment of searches must not mean 
 
 244 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963). 
 245 Id. at 455.  In holding that the distribution of photographs of a nude female 
assault victim invaded the privacy rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the court wrote that it could not “conceive of a more basic 
subject of privacy than the naked body.”  Id. 
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that critical differences in the sexualization of power get overlooked. 
